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I. INTRODUCTION
The federal gratuities statute1 has been the source of confusion and
contention. The confusion stems largely from draftsmanship as well as the
relationship between the gratuities offense and bribery. The federal statute
in which these two crimes are found does not draw a sharp distinction
between the two offenses. The Supreme Court has construed the statute in
a way that further blurs the line.2 The contention, on the other hand, is
reflected in the debate over how far the gratuities offense should reach. It
is possible, perhaps natural, to view the concept of gratuities as reaching
well beyond bribery to cover a wide range of attempts to influence the
governmental process. Thus, gratuities is, in part, a prophylactic
offense—one that can reach “appearances of impropriety.”3 It is this very
breadth that generates the other issues of the gratuities debate, such as
concerns about vagueness, prosecutorial discretion, the criminalization of
ethics issues, and the criminalization of innocent conduct.
In this Article, I will examine the current status of the gratuities debate.
The Article takes as its starting point three recent judicial decisions, from
all three levels of the federal court system.4 In my view, these decisions
reflect strong reservations, even hostility, towards the gratuities offense.
Not surprisingly, the approach to the statute drives a court’s construction of
it. My analysis focuses on the three courts’ approaches, drawing on the
results, but also drawing on general language in the opinions. The strong
reservations that I discern are consistent with many themes of anti-
corruption law as well as broader themes within the legal system.
Obviously, the reservations have considerable force because one of the
courts in which I find them is the Supreme Court.5
On the other hand, I think there are strong arguments for a more
hospitable approach to the statute and broader constructions of it. One can
view the main point of creating a gratuities offense as making available a
prosecutorial tool to reach examples of improper attempts to influence
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6. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
7. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (2006).
8. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 410 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
9. See id. at 404 (Breyer, J., concurring).
10. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 291 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
11. McConnell represents the last extensive treatment of the issue. The various opinions
in Sorrell devote little, if any, consideration to it.
government that bribery cannot reach. However, most of the Supreme
Court’s pronouncements about the nature of corruption, and the strength of
the government’s interest in combating it, are found in the related field of
campaign finance jurisprudence. Thus, I draw heavily on the campaign
finance cases, from Buckley v. Valeo6 to the present.7 Within these cases, I
focus on a debate that mirrors the gratuities debate. Should the
governmental interest that justifies limits on campaign-related financial
activities be viewed as a narrow interest, tied directly to quid pro quo
corruption?8 Or, should the governmental interest be viewed as one that
reaches gratuity-like attempts to influence elected officials?9 Despite the
presence of strong objections to it within the Court,10 the latter approach has
prevailed, at least until now.11 This Article contends that it is helpful to
extrapolate from the campaign finance context to the gratuities context. The
Buckley line of decisions can be seen as support for a hospitable view of the
gratuities statute. The gratuities cases do not cite the campaign finance
cases, but perhaps they should.
Part II of the Article begins the analysis by examining the statute’s
language and purpose. Part III focuses on the three gratuities decisions in
question. Particular results are analyzed where relevant, but the emphasis
is on identifying the courts’ general attitude toward the statute. This Article
discusses a pattern of strong reservations, even hostility, with regard to the
statute. Part IV attempts to put this pattern in context by discussing themes
within anti-corruption law and the legal system, which point toward a
restrictive attitude. At the same time, I discuss other themes within anti-
corruption law that support a hospitable approach to the statute. Part V
discusses the Supreme Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence from
Buckley to the present. It is in this line of cases that one finds explicit
discussion and debate over the nature of corruption and the government’s
interest in dealing with it. As of now, the thrust of these cases runs counter
to the hostility shown toward the gratuities statute.
II. THE STATUTE
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12. 18 U.S.C.A. § 201 (1994).
Because of the importance of the statutory language creating the
gratuities offense, an extensive excerpt from 18 U.S.C. § 20112 is set forth
below:
§ 201. Bribery of public officials and witnesses
(a) For the purpose of this section—
(1) the term “public official” means Member of Congress,
Delegate, or Resident Commissioner, either before or after such
official has qualified, or an officer or employee or person acting for
or on behalf of the United States, or any department, agency or
branch of Government thereof, including the District of Columbia,
in any official function, under or by authority of any such
department, agency, or branch of Government, or a juror; 
(2) the term “person who has been selected to be a public official”
means any person who has been nominated or appointed to be a
public official, or has been officially informed that such person will
be so nominated or appointed; and
(3) the term “official act” means any decision or action on any
question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may
at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any
public official, in such official’s official capacity, or in such
official’s place of trust or profit.
(b) Whoever—
(1) directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises
anything of value to any public official or person who has been
selected to be a public official, or offers or promises any public
official or any person who has been selected to be a public official
to give anything of value to any other person or entity, with
intent—
(A) to influence any official act; or
(B) to influence such public official or person who has been
selected to be a public official to commit or aid in committing, or
collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the
commission of any fraud, on the United States; or
(C) to induce such public official or such person who has been
selected to be a public official to do or omit to do any act in
violation of the lawful duty of such official or person;
(2) being a public official or person selected to be a public official,
directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts,
2006] GRATUITIES DEBATE AND CAMPAIGN REFORM 1375
13. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
14. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994).
15. See generally Valdes, 437 F.3d at 1276 (defendant indicted for bribery; convicted
or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally or for
any other person or entity, in return for:
(A) being influenced in the performance of any official act; 
(B) being influenced to commit or aid in committing, or to collude
in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of
any fraud, on the United States; or 
(C) being induced to do or omit to do any act in violation of the
official duty of such official or person; . . .shall be fined under this
title or not more than three times the monetary equivalent of the
thing of value, whichever is greater, or imprisoned for not more
than fifteen years, or both, and may be disqualified from holding
any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States.
(c) Whoever—
(1) otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of
official duty
(A) directly or indirectly gives, offers, or promises anything of
value to any public official, former public official, or person
selected to be a public official, for or because of any official act
performed or to be performed by such public official, former public
official, or person selected to be a public official; or
(B) being a public official, former public official, or person
selected to be a public official, otherwise than as provided by law
for the proper discharge of official duty, directly or indirectly
demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept
anything of value personally for or because of any official act
performed or to be performed by such official or person; . . .shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than two years,
or both.13
On initial examination, one might question whether there is a separate
gratuities offense. The only offense referred to in the title is bribery. The
language of subsection (b) contains the familiar elements of bribery, on the
part of both bribers and public officials.14 It is in subsection (c) that one
finds the crime of gratuities, even though the term is not used. The close
relationship of gratuities to bribery is clear. The offense is set forth in a
statute entitled “Bribery,” and its operative language uses many of the same
terms, based on the same definitions. In addition, courts often treat
gratuities as a lesser included offense under bribery.15
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of gratuities).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1) (1994).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(A)-(B) (1994).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1994).
19. Id.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(C) (1994).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(B) (1994).
22. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics,
32 UCLA L. REV. 784, 797 (1985).
23. Steven M. Levin, Notes and Comments: Illegal Gratuities in American Politics:
Learning Lessons From the Sun-Diamond Case, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1813, 1820 (2000).
24. See Lowenstein, supra note 21, at 789.
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1994).
Nonetheless, there are clear differences, suggesting the existence of a
separate and distinct offense. Bribery must be done “corruptly,”16 whereas
that term is absent from the gratuities subsection. Bribes involve the giving
of things of value to “influence” government action.17 Gratuities, in
contrast, involve the giving of things of value “for or because of” official
acts.18 Bribes are forward looking; they involve attempts to influence both
current and future action. Gratuities can be backward-looking as well as
forward-looking. They can be an attempt to reward, or to be rewarded for,
“any official act performed or to be performed . . . .”19 Finally, one should
note the difference in penalties. Bribery can lead to imprisonment for up to
fifteen years, disqualification from office, and a fine.20 A gratuities violation
can lead to a maximum imprisonment of only two years plus a fine.21
Whether these differences are more apparent than real is not an easy
question. As Professor Daniel Lowenstein puts it:
Where, as under federal law, there is . . . a separate gratuities
offense, the definitional difficulties are compounded. Rather than
having to define one difficult boundary (between a bribe and a
lawful act) it is necessary to define two such boundaries (between
a bribe and an unlawful gratuity and between an unlawful gratuity
and a lawful act).22
One approach is to view the gratuity and bribery as “synonomous.”23
Giving or receiving a gratuity is a bribe, but it is a bribe that is sufficiently
removed from hard core bribery that it should be treated less severely. The
notion of gratuities as a lesser included offense within bribery supports this
reading.24 Further support can be found in the fact that giving a thing of
value in order to influence an official’s action is related to giving the thing
of value “for or because of”25 that same action. Of course, to constitute a
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26. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1) (1994).
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994).
28. Charles B. Klein, What Exactly is an Unlawful Gratuity After United States v.
Sun-Diamond Growers? 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 116, 130 (1999).
29. Id.
30. See id. at 120.
31. See id. at 132.
32. See Evans, 149 F. Supp.2d at 1337.
33.  Id.
34. See NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT 131-52 (3d ed. 2000).
lesser included offense, gratuities must be missing an element of bribery.
That element might be the requirement that bribery be done “corruptly,”26
although it is not clear that this extra requirement adds anything, given the
other elements of bribery.27
A different approach views the gratuities offense as almost unrelated to
bribery.28 It is the latter crime that deals with attempts to influence official
action, while the gratuities statute covers “mere rewards for particular
official acts.”29 This approach can explain gifts for past acts or future ones
the official will take.30 Even in the case of backward-looking gratuities,
however, the giver is likely to be attempting to build up future influence.
Gifts to high level officials are not like contributions to the Salvation Army.
The giver may even have matters before the official on which no decision
has been made. Here, the gift looks a lot like a bribe.31
A third approach is to view gratuities as having a broader sweep than
bribery, aimed more at generalized attempts to purchase influence.32 The
offense can be viewed as prophylactic, aimed in part at appearances of
influence seeking or peddling, even, in the words of one federal court, a
prohibition of “non-corrupt conduct.”33 This approach is perhaps reflected
in the treatment of gratuities as a lesser included form of bribery. It has the
advantage of permitting the prosecution to obtain convictions in cases that
look like bribery, but where the jury is reluctant to trigger the harsh
penalties that go with it.
Thus, the gratuities offense is broader than bribery, but it is aimed at the
same evil. Namely, the gratuities offense prohibits the use of private
resources to influence the government to act in a manner which produces
different outcomes than normal processes would reach. The gratuities
offense can be seen as closely related to the “honest services” doctrine that
has evolved under the mail and wire fraud statutes.34 There are problems
with this reading, however. The honest services doctrine has the direct
approval of Congress. The broad influence-seeking construction of § 201(c)
can be attacked as running counter to the statute’s specific requirement that
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35. 526 U.S. 398 (1999).
36. Id. at 400.
37. Id. at 401.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 403.
41. Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 403.
42. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 941 F. Supp. 1262, 1265 (D. D.C. 1996).
a gratuity be given “for or because of” any official act. Moreover, the
influence seeking construction may not fit well with a focus on backward-
looking gratuities. In any event, there is obviously substantial play in the
line when a court is called on to apply the statute. The next section analyzes
three cases in which courts expressed reservations, even hostility, about the
scope of the statute. The section explores the extent to which this attitude
can, and does, affect a choice among possible constructions.
III. JUDICIAL RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE GRATUITIES STATUTE—THREE
CASES
A. Sun-Diamond—The Supreme Court Speaks
The most important case is the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California.35 Sun-Diamond is a trade
association of agricultural cooperatives.36 The case arose out of a number
of gifts it made to Secretary of Agriculture Michael Espy.37 The cooperative
had an interest in two matters on which the Secretary might act.38 However,
the prosecution’s theory was not that the gifts were given to influence these
potential acts. Instead, the government, through the Office of Independent
Counsel,39 argued that the gratuities statute was violated if the defendant
cooperative gave the gifts because of the Secretary’s official position.40 The
district court upheld this view of the statute despite the requirement that
gratuities be given or offered “for or because of any official act . . . .”41 It
ruled as follows:
To sustain a charge under the gratuity statute, it is not necessary for
the indictment to allege a direct nexus between the value conferred
to Secretary Espy by Sun-Diamond and an official act performed
or to be performed by Secretary Espy. It is sufficient for the
indictment to allege that Sun-Diamond provided things of value to
Secretary Espy because of his position.”42
Its charge to the jury stated, in part, that “[t]he gratuity statute makes it a
2006] GRATUITIES DEBATE AND CAMPAIGN REFORM 1379
43. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 138 F.3d 961, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
44. See Sun-Diamond, 941 F. Supp. at 1268.
45. See Sun-Diamond, 138 F.3d at 977.
46. Id. at 968.
47. Id. at 969.
48. Id. at 966.
49. Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 414.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 406.
52. Id. (emphasis added).
crime for a person or company to knowingly and willingly give a public
official a thing of value because of his official position whether or not the
giver or receiver intended that particular official’s acts be influenced.”43
The district court’s interpretation of the statute was in accord with
several appellate decisions adopting the “official position” approach.44 The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, however, reversed
the conviction and rejected the “official position” approach.45 It emphasized
the “official act” requirement, reasoning that the district court had,
essentially, read this language out of the statute.46 This formulation of the
applicable test seemed to stop short of a link between a gift and official acts,
at least in the case of a forward looking gratuity. “That an official has an
abundance of relevant matters on his plate should not insulate him or his
benefactors from the gratuity statute—as long as the jury is required to find
the requisite intent to reward past favorable acts or to make future ones
more likely.”47 Yet, the court had stated earlier that “a gift looking to future
acts can be an unlawful gratuity where the giver is motivated simply by the
desire to increase the likelihood of one or more specific, favorable acts.”48
There is obviously a considerable difference between these two
formulations. It is the difference between gratuities given to acquire greater
influence or “access,” and those given in relation to a specific act. The first
approach is a mid-point between the “official position” concept of gratuities
and a bribery-like view of the offense. The bribery-like view is represented
by the second approach. The Supreme Court found that the D.C. Circuit
followed the second approach.49 
In a unanimous decision, the Court affirmed the D.C. Circuit,50
including its rejection of the official position test.51 Its analysis, however,
appears to require a link to an official act in all cases, regardless of whether
the gratuity is forward-looking or backward-looking. Justice Scalia wrote
the opinion. Not surprisingly, he focused on the statute’s text, in particular
what he described as the prohibition “only [of] gratuities given or received
‘for or because of any official act performed or to be performed.’”52
Justice Scalia expressed concern that gifts might be given to officials
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53. Id. at 408.
54. Id.
55. Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 408.
56. Id. at 409.
57. Id. at 414.
58. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 27, at 124 (supporting Sun-Diamond decision). But see
Levin, supra note 22, at 1830 (criticizing Sun-Diamond decision).
59. See Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 408.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 27, at 124.
62. Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 404.
in purely innocent contexts.53 He cited replica jerseys given to the President
by visiting sports teams, and a gift of a school baseball cap to the Secretary
of Education during a visit by him to the school.54 The way to eliminate
such “absurdities”55 is to require a connection between the gift and an
official act as defined in the statute. “[I]t seems to us most implausible that
Congress intended the language of the gratuity statute—“for or because of
any official act performed or to be performed”—to pertain to the office
rather than (as the language more naturally suggests) to particular official
acts.”56
In Sun-Diamond, the Court held that “in order to establish a violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A), the government must prove a link between a
thing of value conferred upon a public official and a specific ‘official act’
for or because of which it was given.”57 Sun-Diamond is a controversial
decision.58 The analysis focuses, in part, on gratuities given as rewards.59
With respect to forward-looking gratuities, Justice Scalia conjures up a
hypothetical of a large computer company which wants to merge with
another large computer company, and the former company wants to make
a gift to the incoming head of the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice, who has already stated his approval of the merger.60 Wouldn’t the
gift be more troubling if the recipient had not indicated his position?
Defenders of Sun-Diamond will no doubt argue that we have the crime of
bribery to take care of such situations.61 But bribery may not be available
if the merger is still in the early planning stage, and the future official’s role
is uncertain. After Sun-Diamond, the gratuities offense is not available, but
it ought to reach such situations and attempts to build “a reservoir of
goodwill.”62
Thus, Sun-Diamond eliminates from the statute’s ambit those cases in
which the statute performs its most valuable function. Perhaps the “official
position” interpretation did strain the language. Perhaps the answer lies in
a middle ground approach, such as the D.C. Circuit’s requirement that “the
jury . . . find the requisite intent to reward past favorable acts or to make
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63. Sun-Diamond, 138 F.3d at 969 (emphasis added).
64. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 679 (1990) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
65. Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 407.
66. This may have been the situation in Sun-Diamond itself.
67. Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 408.
68. Id at 409.
69. Id at 410.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 409.
72. Id. at 410.
73. Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 412.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 411.
76. Id. at 408.
future ones more likely.”63 This approach leaves the gratuities statute with
considerable bite, it and does not further the questionable notion that gifts,
from affluent citizens and corporations to public officials whose decisions
may affect the gift-givers, are a positive social good.
I do not suggest that Justice Scalia was motivated by any such notion,
or that he finds in giving gratuities the same constitutional interests he finds
in making campaign contributions.64 I do mean to suggest, however, that his
construction of the statute is motivated in part by deep reservations about
it. Take the “absurdities” such as the sports jerseys and the baseball caps.65
These are not the cases that are prosecuted. Rather, the cases prosecuted
involve efforts by gift-givers to increase the chance of favorable regulation,
to avoid unfavorable action, or to secure a governmental benefit.66 Even so,
the “official position” interpretation would leave the door open to absurd
prosecutions, and Justice Scalia was not willing to rely on prosecutorial
discretion in order to prevent such baseless prosecutions.67
Justice Scalia also expressed considerable sympathy for public officials,
and those who deal with them, who must confront a complex set of
criminal,68 civil,69 and regulatory70 provisions dealing with gift-giving. He
described § 201(c) as “merely one strand of an intricate web of
regulations,”71 and “merely the tip of a regulatory iceberg.”72 Warming to
the subject, he evoked a “regulatory puzzle,”73 consisting of “numerous . . .
regulations and statutes littering this field.”74 The result of this maze could
be “snares for the unwary.”75 Underlying this concern may be the fact that
adoption of the “official position” approach would turn the gratuities statute
into a “broadly prophylactic criminal prohibition upon gift giving . . . .”76
Such a statute, like a statute aimed at “appearances” of ethical wrongdoing,
clearly raises red flags for Justice Scalia.
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77. 437 F.3d 1276 (D.C. Cir. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Valdes v. United States, 475 F.3d
1319 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
78. See id. at 1277.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1278.
81. Id.
82. Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 406.
83. Valdes, 437 F.3d at 1278.
84. 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (1994).
85. Valdes, 437 F.3d at 1278.
86. Id. at 1279.
B. Valdes—Getting the Message 
Whatever its basis, Sun-Diamond is aimed, in part, at sending the lower
courts a message about applying the gratuities statute. In United States v.
Valdes,77 a majority panel of the D.C. Circuit applied that message with a
vengeance. Valdes involved payments by an undercover FBI informant to
a D.C. Metropolitan Police detective.78 In return for the payments, the
detective searched the Metropolitan Police database to obtain information
about fictitious motorists, including names and addresses, and, in one case,
whether warrants were outstanding.79 The payments appear to have taken
place both before and after the receipt of the requested information. The
detective was indicted for bribery, and the jury convicted him of “the lesser-
included offense of receipt of an illegal gratuity . . . .”80
The conviction would appear to be a classic application of the gratuities
statute, as construed in Sun-Diamond. There was transfer of a thing of value
to a public official, with an obvious link to official acts “performed or to be
performed” by him.81 This result is clearly in line with Justice Scalia’s view
of the statute: “[t]he insistence upon an ‘official act,’ carefully defined,
seems pregnant with the requirement that some particular official act be
identified and proved.”82 A majority panel of the D.C. Circuit, however,
reversed the conviction on the ground that the database queries were not
“official acts.”83
Focusing on the definition subsection of § 201,84 the majority noted that
there must be a “decision or action,” and that it must be on any “question,
matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy, which may at any time be
pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official.”85 The
majority reasoned that a decision or an action is not enough, and that the
modifying terms “question, matter, cause, etc. . . . suggest at least a
rudimentary degree of formality . . . .”86 The court cited adjudication,
actions with respect to a license, investigation, procurement, policy
decisions, approval of benefits, and ignoring violations of laws the official
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was charged with enforcing as actions that would fit within the modifying
terms.87 The majority criticized the prosecution for focusing solely on the
term “matter,” perhaps in an unstated reliance on the maxim of noscitur a
sociis.88
The court’s main authority is Sun-Diamond, primarily for the Supreme
Court’s discussion of “official acts.”89 The Supreme Court had cited the
“absurdities,” such as the sports jersey and baseball cap, as gifts that would
be reached under the “official position” reading of the statute, which it
rejected.90 However, the Sun-Diamond Court went on to note that although
the acts of officials accompanying those gifts (e.g., hosting a ceremony or
visiting a school) are official acts “in some sense,”91 they are not “official
acts” within the meaning of the statute.92 Thus, by requiring a link between
a gift and the narrower subset of statutory official acts , the Court precluded
the possibility of “absurd” prosecutions.93 
This aspect of Sun-Diamond cuts against the Valdes reasoning. It is true
that the Supreme Court made the point that not all actions taken by an
official are “official acts” for purposes of § 201.94 But the actions the
Sun-Diamond Court cited, as outside the “official acts” definition, are
largely ceremonial actions such as hosting a team or visiting a school.95 The
actions by the Valdes defendant (using a government database to furnish to
a gift giver preferential treatment in the dissemination of governmental
information)96 are far removed from the types of activity the Supreme Court
did not want to see prosecuted. There is a line, but it is hard to see how his
actions fall on the same side of it as a “ceremony, visit, or speech.” In
response to Judge Henderson’s dissent, the majority stated that its own test,
“a decision or action” that directly affects “any formal government decision
made in fulfillment of government’s public responsibilities,”97 would be met
1384 THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1359
98. Id. at 1279.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1287 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
102. Valdes, 437 F.3d at 1287.
103. See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c)(1)(A)-(B) (1994) (emphasis added).
104. Valdes, 437 F.3d at1278.
105. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (b)(1)(C) (1994). See also See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(C) (1994).
106. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1994).
107. In February 2007, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia renedered an
en banc decision in Valdes. Valdes v. United States, 475 F.3d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en
by ignoring violations of laws he was charged with enforcing.98 There is
little or no formality in failure to enforce. Investigations, also cited by the
majority as meeting the test, will often lack formality as well.99 Yet, taking
money for failure to enforce, or failure to investigate, is certainly the type
of evil at which the gratuities statute was aimed. In Valdes itself, as Judge
Henderson pointed out, “a law enforcement officer . . . accepted money
personally for taking action in his official capacity . . . .”100 Again, this is
“precisely the conduct”101 at which the statute was aimed. Perhaps the
majority’s test would work better if the word “formal” were omitted.102 
In attempting to ascertain the meaning of “official act,” one should
consider the language “otherwise than as provided by law for the proper
discharge of official duty,” which appears twice in the gratuities statute.103
The Valdes court apparently viewed this as limiting language.104 In the
bribery section of the same statute, however, similar language (“any act in
violation of the lawful duty of such official or person”)105 plays a
broadening role. Congress seems to have used this language in the bribery
section to catch misdeeds that would not fall under the definition of
“official act.” Thus, it could be argued that bribery reaches a broader range
of official misconduct than does the gratuities offense. If no such language
appeared in the gratuities section, a narrow reading of the latter term would
be supported by this argument. But, the language does appear in the
gratuities section; in fact, it appears twice.106 The natural reading, as well as
the one that harmonizes the treatment of the two offenses, is to view
“otherwise than as provided by law . . .” as constituting a liberal directive.
The breadth of the matters for which one cannot take bribes is the same as
the breadth of the matters for which one cannot accept gratuities. The
contrary reading would lead to the anomalous result that the greater offense
would not include the lesser in many cases. 
Although I find the result questionable, and the dissent’s reasoning
more persuasive, I admit that the matter in Valdes is not free from doubt.
The case seems a strong candidate for en banc review.107 For purposes of
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this Article, the principal question is whether views about the statute, in
particular reservations about it, played a role in the court’s narrow
application. There are several indications that this was the case. For
example, the court conceded that “one or more of [the defendant’s]
disclosures may have been unethical, sanctionable, or even criminal
independently of § 201 . . . .”108 This concession suggests strong
reservations about using the bribery statute (including the lesser included
offense of gratuities) to deal with ethical problems.
The court also expressed hesitation about adopting a construction that
would give the statute a broad sweep.109 Finally, the majority cited Sun-
Diamond for the proposition that “anti-corruption law manifested a maze
of precisely targeted prohibitions, and exceptions from more general
prohibitions,” so that statutes in the field should be narrowly construed.110
In sum, it is far from clear that the majority panel decision in Valdes
correctly interpreted Sun-Diamond’s reasoning on “for or because of,”
thereby answering the quite different question of the meaning of “official
acts.” Still, the decision seems faithful to the spirit of Sun-Diamond’s
narrow approach to the gratuities statute, and the case is noteworthy for the
expression of reservations about the statute.
C. Evans—A Dangerous Statute that Must be Amended 
Finally, it is important to note the views expressed in the 2001 district
court opinion in United States v. Evans.111 Neither the facts (a routine
example of local corruption)112 nor the result (a series of rulings generally
upholding guilty verdicts under several federal statutes)113 are remarkable.
What is remarkable is the candor, or perhaps even hostility, with which the
court discussed its reservation regarding the gratuities statute. The court’s
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analysis was guided by a reading of the statute as different from bribery: a
prohibition of “non-corrupt conduct that gives an appearance of
impropriety.”114 At the end of its opinion, the court offered the following
assessment: 
The gratuity statute, charged against all three Defendants in this
case, is a cause of great concern to this [c]ourt. The potential
breadth of the statute constitutes considerable danger to both public
officials and unwitting citizens who deal with those officials.
When read broadly, as the government urges, all the government
must show to send a case to the jury is that something of value was
given or transferred to a public official by one who had a business
transaction with that official’s agency either in the past or future.
The government argues that once this low threshold is met, the jury
is free to find that a criminal violation occurred, even with no
evidence of wrongdoing, inflated contract prices or other suspect
dealings. The dangers of this interpretation are obvious: it would
ensnare many individuals who had made innocent gifts or loans or
had legitimate business transactions with officials. That is, under
the Government’s interpretation, once evidence of a transfer has
been adduced, the defendant must prove the legitimacy of the
transaction or suffer a possible guilty verdict. The presumption of
innocence appears to have disappeared.115 
Immediately visible is a principal Sun-Diamond theme—gratuities as
a potential trap for the unwary.116 However, for the Evans court, the
Supreme Court’s narrowing construction was not enough. Those who deal
with public officials (and presumably the officials themselves) face the risk
of “criminal prosecutions for innocent acts.”117 Apparently, the court viewed
the Sun-Diamond link as easily satisfied, rather than the heavy burden
prosecutors might have feared after that decision. The combination of a
transfer to an official and action, actual or potential, by that official
involving the transferor may trigger a prosecution.118 Questions of amount,
timing, and form of the transfer may make a difference, but the result is still
a strong risk of unfairness.119 The court apparently felt that judicial remedies
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had been tried and had failed. Its recommended solution was for “Congress
to rewrite the gratuity statute to provide a well-defined harbor for those
dealing with public officials.”120 
Taken together, Sun-Diamond, Valdes, and Evans constitute a powerful
critique of the gratuities statute, as well as judicial responses to the
problems courts have seen in its operation. The next section examines both
the extent to which these developments reflect particular aspects of the
statute, and the extent to which they represent broader judicial responses to
the problems of anti-corruption law.
IV. THE STATUTORY CRITIQUES IN CONTEXT AND A DEFENSE OF THE
GRATUITIES CONCEPT
A. A Badly Drafted Statute
It is possible that the courts find the gratuities statute hard to work with,
and are sending signals to Congress that it needs to be redrafted. In Sun-
Diamond, for example, the Supreme Court rejected the “official position”
reading as “a broadly prophylactic criminal prohibition upon gift giving.”121
The Sun-Diamond Court did not say Congress could not enact such a
statute, but noted that when Congress wanted to impose such restrictions,
it had drafted “clearly framed and easily administrable provisions . . .
imposing gift-giving and gift-receiving prohibitions specifically based upon
the holding of office.”122 The Supreme Court cited narrow prohibitions,
such as that upon a bank employee giving a loan or gratuity to a bank
examiner.123 The Sun-Diamond Court also cited, with apparent approval, a
civil ethics statute prohibiting federal employees from accepting anything
of value from a person “whose interests may be substantially affected by the
performance or non-performance of the individual’s official duties.”124 This
statute utilizes the “prohibited source” approach.125 Some gift-givers and
gift-receivers are barred because of the official’s position and its relation to
the donor’s interests.126 This approach responds directly to the sort of
problem present in Sun-Diamond.127 However, as the Supreme Court noted,
this variant of the official position approach is accompanied by both the
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authorization and promulgation of rules to accompany it.128
In Sun-Diamond, the prosecution’s proposed reading of § 201(c) would
have considerable breadth but none of the protections provided by the
extensive rules. Thus, the Sun-Diamond Court could point to ways of
drafting a statute that would achieve the prosecution’s goal without entering
the thicket of “for or because of.” Given that § 201(c) does contain the “for
or because of” requirement, the Supreme Court required “a link between a
thing of value conferred upon a public official and a specific ‘official act’
for or because of which it was given.”129 This result creates an overlap
between gratuities and bribery, as well as a narrowing of gratuities
prohibitions.130 If Congress does indeed wish to create a broad prophylactic
criminal provision, it must do as the Supreme Court suggests and spell out
the conduct it wishes to cover.
In Valdes, the D.C. Circuit sent a similar message to Congress.131 It
viewed the language defining official act (in particular the reference to “any
question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy . . . .”)132 as limited
to a subset of official acts. The limit the court found in this language was
“at least a rudimentary degree of formality.”133 If Congress had wanted to
go further, it could have utilized “some all-encompassing phrase such as
‘act or conduct related to the official’s work or in any way using
government resources.’”134 
Each case can be seen as a refusal by the judiciary to do Congress’
work for it, thereby forcing the legislature to redraft the gratuities statute if
it really wants to create a broad prohibition. The focus of the Evans court
was not on particular language, but on what the court saw as the statute’s
unduly broad sweep even after Sun-Diamond.135 The court called on
Congress to cut back a statute that “constitutes considerable danger to both
public officials and unwitting citizens who deal with those officials.”136
Congress should provide a safe-haven, a “bright line test” that defines “the
forbidden territory in dealing with public officials so as to avoid criminal
prosecutions for innocent acts.”137 
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B. The Rule of Lenity
Perhaps the courts, at least in Sun-Diamond and Valdes, are applying
the rule of lenity. “The [Supreme] Court has often stated that when there are
two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we
are to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and
definite language.”138 The rule is not referred to in either opinion. Yet, in
reference to anti-corruption statutes, Justice Scalia did offer the following
graphic observation: “[a] statute in this field that can linguistically be
interpreted to be either a meat axe or a scalpel should reasonably be taken
to be the latter.”139 The notion that a broad reading of § 201(c) was
tantamount to using a “meat axe” was obviously troubling to the Supreme
Court.140 A harsh reading of an ambiguous statute would give it a heavy
hand that would generate criminal sanctions in cases where there should not
be a heavy penalty.141 The Valdes court was also concerned with an unduly
broad “sweep.”142 
The rule of lenity emphasizes the role of the legislature, as opposed to
the courts, in defining illegal conduct. Avoiding broad readings (a theme of
the three cases discussed here) confines prosecutions to the core of the
offense. The notion of a core gratuities offense, however, is somewhat
counterintuitive.143 Bribery is the core problem at which the statute is
aimed.144 Bribery is defined as the use of private resources to influence
official conduct, and it is defined in separate language, and it is
accompanied by far harsher penalties.145 The key to bribery is attempts to
influence specific official acts.146 The separate gratuities offense is aimed
at more generalized attempts to influence.147 
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C. Vagueness
The “for or because of” language does not do a good job of defining a
separate gratuities offense. Sun-Diamond can be seen, in part, as an attempt
to make the problem go away by conflating gratuities with bribery.148
Perhaps the judicial reservations about the statute expressed there, and in
the other cases under discussion, also reflect the view that the statute runs
afoul of the vagueness doctrine. Vagueness concerns are closely related to
those underlying the rule of lenity.149 Each doctrine reflects judicial concern
for providing fair warning to citizens, making sure that crimes are defined
by the legislature, not the courts, and providing clear guidance to those who
enforce the law.150
One can find all three concerns in Sun-Diamond.151 As for fair notice to
citizens, the Court showed a general concern for those confronted by a
“regulatory iceberg,”152 and a particular concern that a broad reading of
201c) coupled with other statutes and regulations could lead to “snares for
the unwary.”153 As for the judicial role, the “official position” construction
was a departure from Congress’ practice of drafting “broadly prophylactic
criminal prohibitions upon gift giving. . .”154 in a narrow manner
“specifically based upon the holding of office.”155 Finally, the Court dealt
with guidance to enforcement officials by invoking the “absurd”
prosecutions that the “official position reading would permit.”156 It
expressed its unwillingness to rely on prosecutorial discretion to present
this.157 The reservations about the statute expressed in Evans rest
substantially on fair warning, as well as the risk of “criminal prosecutions
for innocent acts.”158 
The gratuities statute is not vague in the sense of using terms that an
ordinary person cannot understand.159 The uncertainty as to its reach stems
from a tension between the potential breadth of the offense—transfer of
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things of value to acquire influence in general as well as to reward specific
acts—and the apparent narrowness of the “for or because of” language.
(Indeed, the Valdes court narrowed the statute even further through its
construction of “official acts.”)160 The Supreme Court in Sun-Diamond
resolved the tension through its link requirement.161 One of the Court’s
goals was to limit prosecutorial discretion.162 Perhaps the most interesting
aspect of the Evans opinion is the district court’s insistence that the
Supreme Court did not limit it enough. Both courts expressed concern about
the prosecution of “absurd” cases and “innocent” acts.163 One should read
these cases, in part, as reflecting a strand of anti-corruption law that draws
upon the official guidance rationale of vagueness but gives it a special role
in the corruption context: the danger of prosecutorial abuse.
D. Prosecutorial Abuse
A recurring theme in anti-corruption law is the risk of prosecutorial
abuse. I will quote at length from the most well known expression of
it—Judge Winter’s dissent in United States v. Margiotta164 concerning the
reach of the “honest services” doctrine under the mail and wire fraud
statutes:
The limitless expansion of the mail fraud statute subjects
virtually every active participant in the political process to
potential criminal investigation and prosecution. It may be
a disagreeable fact but it is nevertheless a fact that political
opponents not infrequently exchange charges of
“corruption,” “bias,” “dishonesty,” or deviation from
“accepted standards of . . . fair play and right dealing.”
Every such accusation is now potentially translatable into
a federal indictment. I am not predicting the imminent
arrival of the totalitarian night or the wholesale indictment
of candidates, public officials and party leaders. To the
contrary, what profoundly troubles me is the potential for
abuse through selective prosecution and the degree of raw
political power the freeswinging club of mail fraud affords
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federal prosecutors.165
Justice Thomas has expressed similar views in the context of the Hobbs
Act.166 This concern rests on two principal bases. The first is the importance
of a clean reputation to public officials, especially elected ones.167 The
second basis is that the charge is sometimes made that United States
Attorneys use political corruption prosecutions to advance their careers,
including running for office.168 
One can perhaps see concern about the role of selective prosecution in
Sun-Diamond’s treatment of the “absurdities” and Evans’ invocation of the
“danger” of a broad construction of the statute. Each court was troubled by
the possibility of prosecution for innocent acts. Certainly the sports jersey
cases could be dealt with by something like the D.C. Circuit’s test in Sun-
Diamond: gifts showing an “intent to reward past favorable acts or to make
future ones more likely.”169 This test might not, however, satisfy the Evans
court, which saw dangers of unfair prosecutions even under the Supreme
Court’s Sun-Diamond test.170 One’s approach to the issue may depend on
one’s assessment of the desirability of the gifts at issue in the cases that are
brought, or are likely to be brought. Sun-Diamond involved lavish gifts to
the Secretary of Agriculture from a regulated entity.171 Valdes involved cash
payments to a police detective, from a man he met in a nightclub, for the
provision of information from a government database.172 It is hard to see
how such transfers have the social utility or expressive values of campaign
contribution.173 To say that they are or are not “legal” is to pre-determine
the question at issue. Plausible constructions of the gratuities statutes are
available to point in either direction. It may be that the underlying judicial
concern is not over selective prosecution but over any prosecution. Perhaps
the judicial concern about prosecution for gratuities matters reflects an
underlying judgement that they may be wrongful but should not be treated
as criminal. 
2006] GRATUITIES DEBATE AND CAMPAIGN REFORM 1393
174. 149 F. Supp. 2d at 1337 (emphasis added).
175. 437 F.3d at 1280 (emphasis added)..
176. See 526 U.S. at 410 (emphasis added).
177. See id.
178. See Brown, supra note 3, at 753.
179. See Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics In Government Yet?: An Answer
From Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57, 71.
180. See id.
E. Criminalizing Ethics
Let us assume that public officials can engage in forms of misuse of
their position that society would view as wrongful acts that should be
punished as violations of ethical norms but do not rise to the seriousness of
corruption, which should be treated as a crime. All three of the judicial
decisions under consideration here suggest that receipt of gratuities, as
opposed to bribery, falls more on the ethics side of the line. The Evans court
referred to the gratuities offense as a prohibition of “non-corrupt conduct
that gives an appearance of impropriety.”174 The D.C. Circuit in Valdes
stated the detective’s acts may have been “unethical, sanctionable, or even
criminal independently of [section] 201. . . .”175
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Sun-Diamond focused on the wide
range of “ethical rules”176 governing gratuities. The Court may have
stopped short of endorsing such rules as the preferred method of dealing
with gratuities, but it certainly invoked their existence as a reason for
construing the criminal gratuities statute narrowly.177 The Court’s
construction—moving the statute closer to bribery—can be seen as a way
of reserving the criminal sanction for cases of true corruption. 
Drawing the line between ethics violations and true corruption is not
easy. One way to look at the problem is that ethics focuses on the official,178
and aims to deter personal enrichment through office holding as well as
unfair personal advancement of oneself or favored persons. A government
official’s pulling strings to get an unqualified relative hired for a
government post would strike many people as unethical; few would
consider it criminal. Professor Kathleen Clark finds it helpful to analyze
government ethical responsibilities as a fiduciary obligation broken into
four components: a conflict of interest component; an influence component
that subjects transactions with certain beneficiaries to heightened scrutiny;
a partiality component that requires fair and equal treatment of
beneficiaries; and, an avoidance component that presents fiduciaries from
putting themselves in positions of conflict.179 Professor Clark emphasizes
the importance within ethical standards of prophylactic rules.180
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“Appearances” concerns are also important.181 
Corruption, typified by the crime of bribery, focuses on what Professor
Susan Rose-Ackerman analyzes as the unwarranted intrusion of the private
marketplace into the “democratic political system that grants a formal
equality to each citizen’s vote.”182 Resources amassed in the private sector
are used to change public sector outcomes. The opinions analyzed here may
see receipt of gratuities as primarily an ethics problem in that it represents
improper self-enrichment by the officeholder, and creates possibilities (and
appearances) of conflict, improper influence, and partiality. A prophylactic
rule responds to these risks. It works particularly well in the case of a
backward-looking gratuity: payment from an outside source for having done
one’s job. However, gratuities analysis is seriously incomplete if it ignores
the giver. Thus a forward-looking gratuity seems closer to the line, if not,
in fact, on the corruption side. It may well represent a general attempt to
build up influence over future decisions.
F. The Decisions as Examples of the Counterrevolutionary Critique
The judicial decisions analyzed in this Article may reflect reservations
about 18 U.S.C. section 201 (c), both as to its draftsmanship and its
implications, particularly if construed broadly. Alternatively (and
simultaneously), it is possible that they reflect deeper doubts about the
entire concept of gratuities as a criminal offense. These doubts are perhaps
not limited to the gratuities statute. Rather, they can be seen as judicial
agreement with a broader movement within the political and legal culture.
This movement asserts that our society has reached the point of dealing too
harshly with perceived corruption and ethical lapses in the public sector. In
an earlier article, I labeled this movement the “counterrevolutionary
critique” of the post-Watergate consensus.183
In terms of attitudes towards corruption and ethics in government,
Watergate was a defining moment. The scandal led to new institutions such
as the independent counsel,184 new laws such as campaign finance reform,185
and an increased crackdown on political corruption at all levels.186 The
phenomenon that I have referred to as the “post-Watergate consensus”187
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goes beyond institutions and prosecutions. Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. has
referred to “a broad social and political consensus, which preceded but was
later intensified by, the Watergate conspiracy, concerning the gravity of
offenses involving institutional corruption.”188 The consensus involves not
only a general “hard line” on these issues, but an emphasis on curbing the
power of special interest groups and on deterring the appearance of
improper behavior.189
The post-Watergate consensus is no longer dominant, however. Of
equal, if not greater, weight is the counterrevolutionary critique. This
critique rests on the view that post-Watergate zeal to root out corruption
ended up harming the political system and the workings of government.190
For example, the independent counsel (special prosecutor) mechanism, once
viewed as part of the constitutional landscape,191 was allowed by Congress
to expire. Prosecutorial abuses, by independent counsels and others, were
viewed as the inevitable product of what Suzanne Garment called “a self-
reinforcing scandal machine. . . .”192 The counterrevolutionary critique
depicts public officials as trapped in an ethics morass, constantly threatened
by criminal prosecution, and forced to be more concerned with the
appearance of honest government than the fact of effective government.
Rather than an evil, interest groups are seen as a major driving force in a
democratic system that relies heavily on bargain and trade, on give and take
between contending forces to produce the compromises that make
government possible.193 It is hardly remarkable that interest groups will seek
access to public officials in order to express their view and, ultimately,
influence those officials.
At the moment, the counterrevolutionary critique seems in the
ascendancy.194 However, the ongoing debate over campaign finance
regulation, and current concerns with the role of lobbyists195 show that the
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battle is far from over. For purposes of the present Article, the decisions on
the gratuities statute can be analyzed in the context of the debate and seen
as falling on the counterrevolutionary side of the line. The Supreme Court
constricted the gratuities statute in Sun-Diamond, yet it has taken a hard line
in bribery and extortion cases.196 This is not a departure from the
counterrevolutionary position. Bribery is bad under any view of the political
system.197 However, as I pointed out in my earlier work:
Under the counterrevolutionary critique, gifts like those in Sun-
Diamond may require a far more nuanced response than the
harshness of a criminal prosecution, particularly one brought by an
independent counsel. Once one leaves the domain of bribery, one
encounters the fundamental nature of a pluralistic system in which
it is assumed that a large number of interests will attempt to secure
influence by a variety of means. Gifts are common in the private
sector and may represent nothing more than an attempt by lobbyists
to secure a healthy working relationship with policy makers. Even
if they raise ethical questions, these might be better dealt with
through civil and administrative processes than the criminal law.
The latter presents the danger, particularly in the political
corruption context, of prosecutorial abuse and may, depending
upon the wording of any given statute, present “snares for the
unwary.”198 
It is possible to agree with Sun-Diamond’s construction of the gratuities
statute, without endorsing judicial reservations about the gratuities concept.
In the next section I will offer a defense of broad criminal prohibitions on
the giving and receiving of gratuities in the governmental context. The
analysis will draw in part on what I have referred to, somewhat loosely, as
anti-corruption law. It will also draw on the Supreme Court’s decisions
concerning regulations of political campaign finance. Much of the analysis
in the campaign finance cases deals with the prevention of corruption or the
appearance of corruption as a governmental interest sufficiently strong to
permit the curtailment of First Amendment rights. Thus the Court has been
drawn, deeply at times, into discussions of what corruption is. 
V. GRATUITIES AND ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW: FROM BRIBERY TO
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
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A. Gratuities and Anti-Corruption Law
It is possible to view the giving and receipt of gratuities in the public
sector as one of the manifestations of corruption that merit criminal
sanctions. The classic example of such a crime is bribery. As Professor
Lowenstein puts it:
Bribery is “worse” than other crimes. It is a “crime akin to treason,”
a “despicable act.” Those who, having voluntarily assumed public
office, set aside the public trust for private advantage (and those
who tempt public officials to do so) engage in morally
reprehensible conduct by striking at the roots of fairness and
democracy. We want a special crime, with a special stigma, for
such conduct.199
Bribery, however, does not have clear boundaries.200 The gratuities offense,
at least in its forward-looking form, may be viewed as a form of bribery.
Many gratuities convictions start out as bribery prosecutions but do not end
up that way. The government may not be able to prove the core element of
intent to influence a specific act, or the jury may not view the conduct in
question as meriting harsh penalties. In this respect, the Sun-Diamond
result—keeping the gratuities offense close to bribery—makes sense. Even
generalized attempts to gain influence over an official’s acts, at least those
that can be identified, fit within Professor Rose-Ackerman’s concept of
corruption as an intrusion of the private marketplace into the
democratically-based public sector method of allocating governmental
goods and services.201
On the other hand, it may be more accurate to regard gratuities as
different from bribes. The relationship between the transfer of value and
governmental action is just too indirect. This does not mean that gratuities
should not be criminal. Even a diffuse, generalized form of influence based
on the giving of gifts202 can threaten democratic values. Lavish gifts to key
officials can lead to advantages, such as access and agenda setting, that
members of the general public do not enjoy. There are obvious issues of
improper appearances, divided loyalties, preferential treatment, and
inefficient government. The latter concerns may sound more like the
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domain of ethics than the criminal law and its concern with punishment,
incapacitation and rehabilitation. But deterrence is important as well,
particularly if we are dealing with serious misuse of office or attempts to
induce it. Certainly a fundamental question is whether a pluralistic society
in which many forms of rent-seeking are inevitable should view the
gratuities phenomenon as a serious evil which should be deterred. It is here
that questions of appearance and prophylactic measures play a key role, and
argue for criminal treatment of gratutites.
Appearances are what people see; they may be the most immediate
reference point by which citizens can judge their government, indeed,
whether it is theirs. Important public values are served by ethics objectives
such as “integrity, appearances and equal access.”203 In a democracy,
citizens need to know whether these values are respected. As for deterrence
through prophylactic measures, it may be particularly important in the
context of transfers of value for influence. Specific agreements are not
written down; they may not exist at all. Rather, we are in the land of “winks
and nods.”204 Gratuities may be less serious than bribes, but the federal
criminal code recognizes this difference by punishing them less severely.205
It also criminalizes other seeming ethics violations such as acting on a
matter in which the official or a family member has an interest.206
Over forty years ago, in discussing the then-new federal conflict-of-
interest law, Roswell Perkins posited the following principle:
Public officials should not be allowed to accept transfers of
economic value from private sources, even though no bribery is
involved, if the transfer is at the discretion of the transferor as
distinct from being pursuant to an enforceable contract or property
right of the public official. The deleterious results of acceptance of
such transfers may range all the way from natural gratitude to
economic dependence.
The application of the principle is as difficult as its
verbalization. Its scope is shadowy and grey unlike the very distinct
and clear concept of self-dealing. The situations which are fraught
with danger are ones where the flow of economic value can be
turned on and off like a faucet. Gifts are the prime example, and
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under most circumstances should be barred.207
Perkin’s words ring true today. His principle, a foundation of the
gratuities statute, ought to guide its application. Anti-corruption law,
whether or not viewed as separate and distinct from ethics, points toward
a hospitable approach to the statute rather than the grudging constructions
in Sun-Diamond and Valdes. In other contexts, courts have construed anti-
corruption statutes broadly.208
It is particularly instructive to compare gifts to public officials with
campaign contributions to those seeking to become public officials.
Campaign contributions implicate important constitutional rights of the
giver: the First Amendment rights of speech and association.209 The
recipient has important interests as well. Given an electoral system based
largely on private financing, receipt of contributions is necessary for most
nonwealthy individuals to participate as candidates within that system.
Gratuities do not play a similar role. In the case of gifts to appointed
officials, they threaten values of neutral administration, as the Perkins quote
suggests. In the case of elected officials, we expect citizens and groups to
show their support, knowing that with support comes influence, but the
mechanism for doing this is the campaign contribution. Gifts may well
constitute an effort to bypass limits on contributions and to acquire
influence outside the open give-and-take of the political process. Indeed,
one can find in the judicial debate over regulation of that process insights
about corruption that are relevant to the gratuities debate.
B. Campaign Finance Doctrine and the Gratuities Offense
1. A Helpful Comparison?
The term campaign finance reform covers a multitude of issues ranging
from attack ads to public financing of campaigns.210 The discussion here
will focus on the validity of limits on campaign contributions and campaign
spending. In analyzing the constitutionality of limits, the Supreme Court has
discussed extensively both the government’s interest in deterring corruption
or the appearance thereof and the meaning of corruption. In this section, I
1400 THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1359
211. Buckley, for example, was a pre-enforcement challenge authorized by Congress.
212. For example, Sun-Diamond and Valdes were decided in the context of appeals
from verdicts of guilty.
213. U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV.
214. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
215. E.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-29 (discussing First Amendment aspects).
216. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
will argue that the Court’s conclusions in both inquiries can be applied to
the gratuities issue. Campaign finance reform jurisprudence supports the
notion of gratuities as something that government can prevent and thus
supports a hospitable construction of the current statute.
One must first consider, however, whether the two areas of law present
such different issues that lessons from one cannot be applied to the other.
Campaign finance cases do not draw on anti-corruption law, nor does the
converse occur. Campaign finance questions involve the electoral process
and those who participate in it. Gratuities cases usually arise outside of the
campaign context and are more likely to involve appointed rather than
elected officials. Although the criminal law can come into play if a
campaign finance restriction is violated, the cases are typically pre-
enforcement challenges to a law or an administrative interpretation.211 The
gratuities cases, on the other hand, are criminal prosecutions.212
Another potentially significant difference is that the gratuities cases
involve statutory construction—the meaning of “for or because of,” for
example—while constitutional issues loom large in campaign finance.
There is, no doubt, a constitutional subtext in the gratuities cases: concerns
rooted in the Due Process Clause213 about fair warning to citizens and even
whether the underlying conduct should be criminal. The First
Amendment214 dominates the constitutional discussion of campaign finance
regulation.215 What links the two lines of cases is a concern over what
constitutes corruption that government can prevent. In each area the
question of improper influence within the political/governmental process is
central. The campaign finance cases are more explicit in identifying and
weighing the governmental interest in preventing corruption. Their
conclusions can be applied to the gratuities issue, despite the contextual
differences.
2. Buckley and the Foundational Concepts: Preventing Corruption and
its Appearance as a Governmental Interest
Current campaign finance doctrine is based on the seminal 1976
decision in Buckley v. Valeo.216 The decision addressed the broad range of
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regulations contained in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,217 but
the analysis here will be limited to contribution and expenditure limitations.
The Court first reasoned that important First Amendment interests were at
stake.218 Both forms of restriction infringed on political discourse: the realm
where the constitutional “guarantee has its fullest and most urgent
application.”219 Moreover, the restrictions affected rights of speech and
rights of association. The Court, however, drew a distinction between
contribution limitations and expenditure limitations.220 The former
constituted, in the Court’s view, less of a restriction on speech since the
contribution itself, rather than the amount, is the key expressive act.221
The Court’s analysis then turned to a weighing of competing interests
similar, but not identical, to the process of applying “strict scrutiny.”222
With respect to contribution limits, the Court held that the government’s
interest in preventing corruption or its appearance justified the restriction
of First Amendment rights:
To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political
quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity
of our system of representative democracy is undermined.
Although the scope of such pernicious practices can never be
reliably ascertained, the deeply disturbing examples surfacing after
the 1972 election demonstrate that the problem is not an illusory
one.
Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo
arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption
stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse
inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions.223
Despite the references to the concept of quid pro quo, the Court rejected
the argument that bribery and disclosure laws could deal with the problem
in the campaign context.224 When it came to expenditure limitations,
however, the Court’s scrutiny of the government interest yielded a different
result.225 In particular, the Court rejected a limit on “independent
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expenditures”—those made by third parties to help candidates without co-
ordination—on the ground that these expenditures did not “pose the same
dangers of real or apparent quid pro quo arrangements as do large
contributions.”226 The Court did not see a risk of “improper commitments”
from a candidate in return for expenditures.227
For purposes of the argument advanced here—that campaign finance
jurisprudence supports a hospitable approach to the concept of gratuities
and to the statute prohibiting them—three aspects of Buckley are key. The
first is the Court’s view that something more than bribery laws alone is
needed to satisfy the anti-corruption interest. In the election context, the
something more is the prophylactic limit on contributions. In the broader
governmental context, it is the prophylactic ban on gratuities, whether
outright as advocated by Perkins or in delineated circumstances. A second
important point is the Buckley Court’s emphasis on appearances and “the
opportunities for abuse.”228 The concept of appearances is controversial,229
particularly the notion of a link between campaign finance and public
confidence.230 However, the Court relied heavily upon it as a separate, and
distinct (and “almost equal”) ground for upholding restrictions on
constitutional rights.231 If appearances concerns can support this
governmental action, they are certainly relevant to the nature and scope of
the gratuities offense.
Finally, there is the question of what the Buckley Court meant by
corruption.232 Attempts have been made to treat its view of corruption as
essentially limited to bribery-like quid pro quo arrangements.233 There is
some support for this narrow reading in the treatment of expenditure
limits.234 Such a reading would support narrow approaches to the federal
gratuities statute such as that in Sun-Diamond.235 However, the discussion
of contribution limits indicates a broader view of what constitutes
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corruption236. The Court in Buckley rejected bribery laws as sufficient to
support the anti-corruption interest because those laws “deal with only the
most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence
governmental action.”237 Gratuities laws are a principal means of dealing
with such attempts and of addressing the problem of improper influence.
Moreover, the concept of an “appearance of quid pro quo corruption,” if not
a contradiction in terms, is not easily limited. It suggests a relationship of
influence, which is improper because it was generated by the contribution.
But, as Professor Lowenstein has pointed out, securing influence is a major
reason why people make—supposedly permissible—campaign
contributions.238 Under the Court’s view, the size of the contribution
becomes the proxy for its improper nature.239 This is a frank
acknowledgment of the importance of prophylactic legislation in the
corruption context. Thus Buckley can be read as support for an appearance-
based offense like gratuities, and as reflecting a broad view of corruption
that supports efforts to deal with it that sweep broadly.
C. From Buckley to Shrink—Elaborating on the Meaning of Corruption
Ever since it was handed down in 1976, Buckley and its analytical
framework have dominated the debate over campaign finance regulation.
This thirty-year dominance has persisted despite sharp divisions within the
Court over Buckley and intense criticism by many commentators.240 For
present purposes, the most important issue developed by the Court is the
meaning of “corruption.” Under the Buckley framework, the prevention of
corruption or its appearance is the only governmental interest strong enough
to outweigh the substantial First Amendment interests at stake in campaign
finance regulation.241 In the 1985 decision in Federal Election Commission
v. National Conservative Political Action Committee,242 Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion emphasized a narrow concept of corruption, focusing
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on “the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors.”243 Perhaps the
meaning of corruption can thus be narrowed, although I have already noted
the inherent push toward breadth that comes with introduction of the
concept of the “appearance of corruption.” In any event, other post-Buckley
decisions appeared to significantly broaden corruption to include more
general notions of improper influence.244 In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce245 a majority of the Court viewed corporate expenditures to
influence a campaign as a form of “corruption.”246 Justice Marshall, writing
for the majority, focused on the special problem of resources amassed
through the corporate form.247 However, it would be a mistake to limit
Austin to the category of just a “corporations” case.248 Professor Briffault
has argued that the decision points in the direction of an equality rationale
for campaign finance regulation, despite the fact that Buckley itself had cast
doubt on any such rationale.249 In terms of comparing campaign finance
theory with the gratuities debate, the important point about Austin is the
Court’s willingness to take a broad view of the meaning of corruption. 
The general question of how far Buckley’s concept of corruption might
stretch came to a head in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,250 a
case involving the validity of state contribution limits. Justice Souter, for
the majority, offered a sweeping definition. Drawing on Buckley, he stated
the Court’s position as follows:
In speaking of “improper influence” and “opportunities for abuse”
in addition to “quid pro quo arrangements,” we recognized a
concern not confined to bribery of public officials, but extending
to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes
of large contributors. These were the obvious points behind our
recognition that the Congress could constitutionally address the
power of money “to influence governmental action” in ways less
“blatant and specific” than bribery.251
This broad approach to corruption in the campaign finance context builds
on the notion of “improper influence” in much the same way as the
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approach to the gratuities offense advocated here. Indeed, Justice Souter
asserted that the interests invoked to justify the contribution limits were the
well-recognized interests that “underline bribery and anti-gratuity
statutes.”252 In reaching this position he relied heavily on the concept of
appearances.253
The majority’s view of corruption did not go unchallenged. In dissent,
Justice Thomas echoed Chief Justice Rehnquist in reading Buckley as
limited to quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.254 He chastised the
Court for “significantly extending” Buckley,255 and giving corruption a
“new, far reaching . . . definition.”256 He then attempted to use Buckley
against itself, so to speak, by arguing that since its core view of corruption
is so closely related to bribery, bribery statutes can be used to attack
corruption without sacrificing the First Amendment interests present in the
campaign context.257 Buckley had rejected this argument, relying in part on
the concept of appearances.258
One can find in Justice Thomas’ reliance on bribery statutes echoes of
some of the arguments against gratuities statutes. For example, he criticized
the majority for relying on “vague and unenumerated harms”259 to justify
the restrictions at issue in Shrink. He also suggested that campaign
contribution restrictions could impede the interaction between citizens and
those who represent them.260 Both points resemble the critiques that anti-
gratuity statutes sweep too broadly and can embrace innocent, even
desirable activity. Indeed, one might view the insistence on a quid pro quo
as reflecting the same concerns as Sun-Diamond’s insistence on a link
between a gratuity and a specific official act. Corruption must be tied to an
identifiable purchase or attempt to purchase governmental favor. In a
striking parallel to the counterrevolutionary critique, Justice Thomas even
warned against a definition of corruption that seeks to achieve a “state of
purity.”261
Any discussion of Shrink should touch, at least briefly, on the aspect of
the case that has attracted the most attention: the divisions within the Court
over the continuing viability of Buckley. One leading scholar viewed Shrink
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as possibly representing “the beginning of the end of the Buckley era.”262 It
is not hard to see why. Justices Thomas and Scalia, dissenting, called for
overruling Buckley.263 Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, concurring, said they
might also come to that position.264 Justice Kennedy appeared to agree with
the views expressed in both of these opinions,265 while Justice Stevens
asserted that the campaign finance regulation problem should not be viewed
as a First Amendment issue at all.266 Even Justice Souter seemed a bit
tentative in his defense of Buckley. He noted that the plaintiffs had not
requested that it be overruled, and responded somewhat testily to questions
raised by other justices that “the answer is that we are supposed to decide
this case.”267
Reports of Buckley’s death may be premature, however. Justices
Thomas and Scalia wanted to overrule it because it permitted too much
regulation268. Justices Breyer and Ginsburg worried that Buckley stood in
the way of sound regulation.269 Justice Kennedy’s position is uncertain,
especially after his dissent in McConnell v. Federal Elections
Commission,270 discussed below. One must also factor in the addition of
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito to the Court. More fundamentally,
Buckley’s weakness may also be its strength. It was a compromise from the
outset, a “half-way house”271 that gives proponents of regulation something
by permitting some regulation, and gives opponents something by
forbidding other forms of regulation. Their effort to narrow the concept of
corruption can thus be seen as an effort to confine Buckley, if it cannot be
overruled.
D. McConnell—Intensifying the Debate over Corruption
McConnell is a multi-faceted decision upholding much of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA).272 The discussion here will focus
on that part of the decision dealing with “soft money,” i.e. money given to
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a political party rather than directly to a candidate for federal office.273
McConnell upheld substantial restrictions on soft money, amounting to
what the Court called “tak [ing] national parties out of the soft-money
business.”274 I will focus on two key aspects of this part of the decision: the
majority’s broadening of the corruption concept into a gratuities mode, and
Justice Kennedy’s sharp rejection of this development and his
accompanying effort to narrow the concept to quid pro quo roots.
The majority found that contributions to the parties, that often ended up
helping candidates, presented the same danger of corruption that Buckley
had found sufficient to justify limits on direct contributions.275 In doing so,
the Court moved beyond Buckley, and even beyond Shrink. Not
surprisingly, it relied on the concept of appearance, in particular the evil of
“the appearance of undue influence. . . .”276 Soft money contributions could
create an atmosphere of “gratitude,”277 “debt,”278 and an inclination to
reciprocate.279 Thus, soft money contributors would be likely to enjoy
greater “access to high-level government officials.”280 Congress had a
legitimate interest, beyond “preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption”281
in curbing “undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the
appearance of such influence.”282 The combination of undue generalized
influence, appearance of influence and the danger of access peddling are
core justifications for a gratuities statute that is separate and distinct from
bribery.
In a strong dissent, Justice Kennedy first argued for the narrow, quid
pro quo reading of Buckley.283 Emphasizing that First Amendment rights
were at stake, he reiterated that only one governmental interest justifies
curtailing them in the campaign finance context: “eliminating, or
preventing, actual corruption or the appearance of corruption.”284 If there is
no proof of particular corrupt action, general campaign finance regulation
is constitutional “only if it regulates conduct posing a demonstrable quid
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Access in itself. . .shows only that in a general sense an officeholder favors
someone or that someone has influence on the officeholder. There is no basis, in
law or in fact, to say favoritism or influence in general is the same as corrupt
favoritism or influence in particular. By equating vague and generic claims of
favoritism or influence with actual or apparent corruption, the Court adopts a
definition of corruption that dismantles basic First Amendment rules, permits
Congress to suppress speech in the absence of a quid pro quo threat, and moves
beyond the rationale that is Buckley’s very foundation. Id.
pro quo danger.”285 The majority had broadened Buckley by taking language
from prior cases, particularly Shrink, out of context. For Justice Kennedy,
even those cases required a quid pro quo danger.286 That danger was present
there because the contribution went directly to candidates. BCRA was
unconstitutional because it restricted contributions to parties.287 He offered
the following rule:
Congress’ interest in preventing corruption provides a basis for
regulating federal candidates’ and officeholders’ receipt of quids,
whether or not the candidate or officeholder corruptly received
them. Conversely, the rule requires the Court to strike down
campaign finance regulations when they do not add regulation to
“actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements.”288 
The mere fact that conduct “wins goodwill from or influences a member of
Congress”289 does not make it corrupt. The conduct has to constitute “undue
influence” because of a quid pro quo or a potential one.290 
For Justice Kennedy, the majority had invented a “new definition of
corruption”291 through improper reliance on the concept of appearance of
corruption. He took particular exception to the condemnation of increased
access through party donations as corrupt.292 Access by itself is not
corruption or its appearance. Favoritism and influence are inevitable in
representative politics. Elected officials will respond to those who support
them. The only workable way to identify “bad” responsiveness is to look
for a quid pro quo. The majority’s broad approach runs counter to theories
of democratic representation and does violence to the First Amendment.293
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I have highlighted Justice Kennedy’s disagreement with the majority
for several reasons. His attempt to limit Buckley’s view of corruption is
analytically difficult as long as that view includes an appearance
component. Take Justice Kennedy’s reference to a “quid pro quo threat.”294
Until the candidate is elected, how can such a threat be identified? Who
knows what matters will come before a legislator, for example? Much will
depend on committee assignments, actions by other committees, actions by
the other branch, etc. Are past acts of favoring the contributor relevant? To
say that they pose a “quid pro quo threat” is to cast doubt on behavior that
Justice Kennedy would view as legitimate. As long as the Buckley
formulation stands, it points towards a broad view of corruption similar to
that underlying the gratuities offense. However, supporters of the approach
to gratuities advocated here should not put too many eggs in the campaign
finance basket. Another reason for emphasizing Justice Kennedy’s views
is that his doubts about regulation might lead him to advocate a
reformulation of Buckley’s rationale along narrower lines. There is sharp,
and growing, disagreement within the Court over campaign finance. When
the Court takes its next step in that area, Justice Kennedy will be a pivotal
figure. In Shrink he had sounded some pro-regulation notes.295 That is not
the tone of his McConnell dissent in which he criticized the majority for
misapplying Buckley.296 In Shrink he had advocated overruling it.297
E. Randall v. Sorrell—Spending Limits and the Buckley Framework
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to overrule Buckley in Randall
v. Sorrell.298 Sorrell involved challenges to several aspects of a wide-
ranging Vermont campaign finance statute.299 Analysis here will focus on
the constitutionality of the spending limits imposed by the law. Buckley
appeared to invalidate spending limits categorically.300 However, there had
long been arguments that contribution limits by themselves were not
sufficient to achieve true reform, that the Court should and would be open
to changed circumstances in the world of campaign finance, and that a
legislative scheme limiting both contributions and spending might be
hospitably received.301
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312. The plurality consisted of Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Breyer (who wrote the
opinion), and Justice Altito (who concurred in part).
A divided panel of the Second Circuit upheld the spending limits.302
Building on Buckley and subsequent cases, the majority identified two
compelling state interests: the anti-corruption interest303 and the “time
protection” interest.304 The key to the first was demonstrating that
“unlimited spending is part of the corruption problem.”305 Not surprisingly,
the Court drew on the broader definitions of corruption found in cases such
as Shrink and McConnell. The ability of large contributors to achieve
influence, or perceived influence, increased access and agenda-setting
power, and their ability to circumvent contribution limits through
“bundling” all contributed to what the court viewed as a situation where
power was sold and purchased, and where the public perceived this to be
the case.306 Contribution limits were not enough because the increasing need
to raise large sums of money created a gap between contributors, especially
large ones, and other citizens.
The “time protection” interest was presented as closely related to anti-
corruption concerns.307 Because candidates’ time is finite, they must focus
their energies on fund raising and those who will help it. “Special interests,
well placed to take advantage of candidates’ fear of losing [the] fundraising
war, dominate candidates’ time and thereby have been able to exercise
substantial control over the information that passes to candidates.”308 The
court not only joined the two interests it had identified as compelling,309 it
linked them to Buckley through the notion that candidates’ time and their
decision making power were for sale. Thus there was a quid pro quo:
“Vermont has shown that, without expenditure limits, its elected officials
have been forced to provide privileged access to contributors in exchange
for campaign money.”310
A sharply divided Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit by a
margin of six-to-three.311 A three-justice plurality held the spending limits
invalid, invoking Buckley and rejecting the time protection interest.312
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Justice Kennedy concurred separately,313 as did Justices Thomas and
Scalia.314 Justice Stevens would have overruled Buckley on expenditure
limits,315 but joined Justices Souter and Ginsburg in finding that they might
survive a Buckley analysis if the time protection interest was considered.316
There is little discussion of the nature of corruption.317 In sum, Sorrell
constitutes an anti-regulation decision, but leaves the Buckley framework
intact.
I have advanced the argument that the Court’s decisions in the area of
campaign finance reform are support for a broad approach to the area of
gratuities. The Court has permitted legislatures to limit First Amendment
freedoms on the basis of views of corruption that resemble those that
support the concept of a gratuities offense, broadly construed. Would that
support disappear if the Court changed its view of corruption to a less broad
reading of Buckley focusing on the original decision? At this tentative stage,
let me offer two responses.
The first is that, even as decided, Buckley did not take a narrow view of
corruption. It treated the appearance of corruption as an evil almost on a par
with quid pro quo arrangements themselves.318 Its rejection of the argument
that bribery laws can eliminate such arrangements319 is an endorsement of
prophylactic legislation. The analysis is bolstered by references to
“improper influence” and the importance of citizens’ confidence in
government and the preservation of governmental integrity.320 All of these
concepts lie at the heart of the concept of a broad anti-gratuities prohibition.
Like campaign reform, even as narrowly envisioned in Buckley, the
gratuities offence is a means, other than bribery laws, of furthering these
goals through prophylactic legislation. Even if the Court rejected campaign
finance regulation in favor of reliance on bribery and disclosure, Justice
Thomas appears to advocate a bribery statute that includes gratuities: “a
broadly drawn bribery law would cover even subtle and general attempts
to influence government officials corruptly. And, an effective bribery law
would deter actual quid pro quos and would, in all likelihood, eliminate any
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appearance of corruption in the system.”321
Second, suppose that campaign finance law is restricted through a
narrower definition of the type of corruption that can form the basis of a
compelling governmental interest. That does not mean that post-Buckley
cases were wrong in espousing a broad approach to what conduct
constitutes a subversion of the political process. The Court’s point would
be that more diffuse forms of corruption cannot justify limits on First
Amendment rights, not that government cannot combat these forms of
corruption in other ways. Indeed, a limitation on campaign finance
restrictions would highlight the importance of the gratuities offense as an
important addition to bribery. It might not be available in the campaign
context,322 but it would be a major criminal tool in combating abuses of the
political-governmental process that do not rise to the level of bribery. For
improper acts by non-elected officials such as the defendant in Valdes, the
gratuities offense remains an important safeguard.
V. CONCLUSION
The federal gratuities statute, 18 USC section 201(c), continues to be
a source of confusion and contention. The confusion stems largely from
problems of draftsmanship within the statute, as well as uncertainty
concerning the relationship of the gratuities offense to bribery. Both
offenses are contained in the same statute; the former may be a lesser-
included offense variety of the latter. Many of the problems that have arisen
in this area could be resolved by enactment of an amended statute, perhaps
using the prohibited source model. However, the controversy stems also
from broader concerns about whether the receipt of gratuities by public
officials, even from those they regulate, should be a crime. The argument
that such conduct should not be criminalized can be traced to, and is a part
of, what I have called the “counter-revolutionary critique” of the hard line
on government ethics that grew out of the Watergate scandal. This Article
focuses on recent federal court decisions, including the 1999 Supreme Court
Sun-Diamond case, that appear to show reservations and even hostility
toward the statute. These cases express concern about its potential sweep,
its possible role as a trap for the unwary, and the power it gives to
prosecutors. The recent District of Columbia Circuit decision in United
States v. Valdes is noteworthy in giving a narrow construction to broad
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language, based in part on a negative view of the statute. Nonetheless, this
Article contends that the gratuities statute plays an important role as an
auxiliary to bribery, serving as a prophylactic statute and permitting the
prosecution of “appearances” of unethical behavior. This Article questions
whether gifts from regulated entities to their regulators are examples of
innocent speech that serves a valuable social function.
Campaign contributions, on the other hand are often examples of such
speech. Yet the Court has permitted limiting them, despite serious First
Amendment objections to limits on speech and association. The compelling
governmental interest that permits this regulation bears a strong
resemblance to that underlying anti-gratuity statute: fighting corruption by
curbing attempts to acquire influence that cannot be adequately reached
through bribery laws. This Article traces the evolution of the anti-corruption
interest in the Supreme Court’s decisions beginning with Buckley v. Valeo.
These decisions give added impetus to the considerations underlying anti-
gratuities statutes. Randall v. Sorrell reaches an anti-regulatory result, but
leaves the Buckley framework intact, at least for now. Even if the Court
were to cut back on the scope of the anti-corruption interest in the campaign
finance context, that interest would still be relevant in the context of the
gratuities debate.
